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JURISPRUDENCE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES
By C. PERRY PATTERtSON*
Philosophy of the Law
Law to Justice Holmes in its highest form assumed the char-
acter of a science. No jurist ever labored harder or contributed
more to give it this character. This is a phase of his work in which
he is set apart from the ordinary judge. He was especially inter-
ested m the philosophy of the law. He disliked meticulosity and
constantly sought universalism. He was always looking for rules
and principles which were susceptible of general application. He
realized that as a rule judges are not by nature or training system-
atic philosophers and as a result are usually searching for par-
ticulars.1 Whether it was common law or constitutional law he
was interpreting, he tried to relate it to the general truths of life.
"Justice Holmes," said Wigmore, "seems to me the only one who
has framed for himself a system of legal ideas and general truths
of life, and composed his opinions in harmony with the system al-
ready framed."'2 "Above all others," says Pound, "he has shaped
the methods and ideas that are characteristic of the present as dis-
tinguished from the immediate past."3 "His ideas," says Pound,
"have so thoroughly entered into the substance of our legal thought,
and the papers and addresses in which they were set forth are so
buried in the periodical literature of the law that the epigom could
easily forget whose armor they are wearing and whose weapons
they were wielding."4 Indicating his dislike for petty and transitory
matters, Justice Holmes spoke of the thousand opinions that he
had written by 1900, "Many of them upon trifling or transitory
matters," saying, "A thousand cases, when one would have liked
to study to the bottom and to say his say on every question which
the law has ever presented, and then to go on and invent new prob-
lems which should be the test of doctrine, then to generalice it all
and write it vt continuous, logical, philosophical exposition, setting
*Professor of Government, The University of Texas.
'See Harold J. Laski, The Political Philosophy of Mr. Justice Holmes,
(1931) 40 Yale Law Journal, 683-695.
2John H. Wigmore, Justice Holmes and the Law of Torts, (1916) 29
Har. L. Rev., 601-616.3Roscoe Pound, Judge Holmes' Contribution to the Science of Law,
(1921) 34 Har. L. Rev., 449-453.4jbid., 449.
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forth the whole corpus with its roots in history and its justifications
of expedience real or supposed "5
He enjoyed the pursuit of truth. "One begins," he said, "with
a search for a general point of view After a time he finds one, and
then for a while he is absorbed in testing it, in trying to satisfy
himself whether it is true. But after many experiments or investi-
gations all have come out one way, and his theory is confirmed ard
settled in his mind. He knows in advance that the next case will
be but another verification, and the stimulus of anxious curiosity
is gone. He realizes that his branch of knowledge only presents
more illustrations of the uirversal principle; he sees it all as an-
other case of the same old ennui, or the same sublime mystery,--
for it does not say what epithets you apply to the whole of things,
they are merely judgments of yourself. At this stage the pleasure
is no less, perhaps, but it is pure pleasure of doing the work, ir
respective of further aims, and when you reach that stage you
reach, as it seems to me, the triune formula of the joy the duty
and the end of life.
' 7
"It was of this," he said, "that Malebranche was thinking when
he said that, if God held in one hand truth, and in the other the
pursuit of truth, he would say 'Lord, the truth is for thee alone,
give me the pursuit.' "
This attitude of Justice Holmes to give a generalization or a
philosophy to the law was undoubtedly created by the nature of the
law as he found it when he began the task of mastering it. "My
way," he said, "has been by the ocean of the law On that I have
learned a part of the great lesson, the lesson not of law, but of
life. There were few of the charts and lights for which one longed
when I began. One found oneself plunged in a thick fog of details
-in a black and frozen night, in which were no flowers, no spring,
no easy joys. Voices of authority warned that in the crush of that
ice any craft might sink. One heard Burke saying that law sharpens
the mind by narrowing it. One heard in Thackery of a lawyer
bending all the powers of a great mind to a mean profession. One
saw that artists and poets shrank from it as from an alien world.
One doubted oneself how it could be worthy of the interest of an
intelligent mind. And vet one said to oneself, law is human--t is a
part of man, and of one world vith all the rest."' Again he said
5Speeches (1934) 83. Italics are mine.
6lbid., 84.
Ibzd., 84.
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"I can but envy the felicity of the generation to whom it is made
so easy to see their subject as a whole. When I bega, the law
presented itself as a rag bag of details. The best approach that I
found to general views on the historical side was the first volume
of Spencer's Equitable Jurtsdicton, and, on the political, Walker's
Amrertwca Lw."-9
He determined to give organic form to the law which he called
"a fimte body of dogma." He -regarded the law as a body of pre-
dictions as to what the courts would say. "The number of our pre-
dictions when generalized and reduced to a system," he said, "is
not unmanageably large.""0 "I wish, if I can," he said, "to lay
down some first principles1' for the study of this body of dogma
or systematized prediction which we call the law, for men who
want to use it as the instrument of their business to enable them to
prophesy in their turn, and, as bearing upon the study, I wish to
point out an ideal which as yet our law has not attained."1 2:
Justice Holmes was not so much interested in the law per se
as he was in the science of the law He was more concerned with
jurisprudence. He said that "science and philosophy are themselves
necessaries of life."' 3 "Of course," he said, "the law is the calling
of thinkers.' 4 He said "the law will furnish philosophical food
to philosophical minds."'' 3 "For every fact," he said, "leads to
every other by the path of the air. Only men do not yet see how,
always. And your business as thinkers is to make plainer the way
from something to the wle of things: to shrw the rational con-
nection between your fact and the frame of the universe. If your
subject is law, the roads are plain to anthropology, the science of
man, to political economy, the theory of legislation, ethics, and
thus by several paths to your final view of life."'"
He had a grand conception of the law and believed that in its
scientific character it rose to the heights of the cosmic, and became
man's greatest achievement. In this form it became jurisprudence,
which he said, "is simply law in its most generalized part."'
"Every effort," he said, "to reduce a case to a rule is an effort of
9Ibid., 301.
lOlbid., 169.
"'By general principles, he said, he did not mean "a throng of glittering
generalities, like a swarm nf little bodiless cherubs fluttering at the top of one
of Carrigio's pictures," Ibid., 42.
'lIbd., 169.
'3Speeches (1934), 50.
14Collected Legal Papers (1920), 300.
ViSpeeches (1934), 23.
'
0 Collected Legal Papers (1920), 195.
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jurisprudence."',- He spoke of jurisprudence as "that cenotaph
shaped by the genius of our race, and by powers greater than the
greatest individual, yet to which the least may make their contribu.
tion and inscribe it with their names. The glory of lawyers, like
that of men of science, is more corporate than individual. Our labor
is an endless organic process. The organism whose being is re-
corded and protected by the law is the undying body of society ""
-kccording to this view of the law, a great lawyer, lie said, could
connect himself "with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite,
a glimpse of its unfathomable process, a hint of the universal.'"
This grand conception of the law was painted by Holmes in
inimitable style and with impressive eloquence. "What a subject is
this in which we united," he exclaimed, "-this abstraction called
the Law, wherein, as in a magic mirror, we see reflected, not only
our own lives, but the lives of all men that have been I When I
think on this majestic theme, my eyes dazzle. If we are to speak
of the law as our mistress, we who are here know that she is a
mistress only to be wooed with sustained and lovely passion,-only
to be won by straining all the faculties by which man is likest to
a god. Those who, having begun the pursuit, turn away uncharined,
do so either because they have not been vouchsafed the sight of her
divine figure, or because they have not the heart for so great
struggle. To the lover of the law, how small a thing seem the
novelist's tales of the loves and fates of Daphoris and Chloe I I-low
pale a phantom even the circe of poetry, transforming mankind
with intoxicating dreams of fiery ether, and the foam of suiimer
seas, and glowing greensward, and the white arms of women I
when I think thus of the law, I see a princess mightier than she
who once wrought at Bayeux, eternally weaving into her web dim
figures of the ever-lengthening past,-figures too dim to be noticed
by the idle, too symbolic to be interpreted except by her pupils, but
to the discerning eye disclosing every painful step and every world-
shaking contest by which mankind has worked and fought its way
from savage isolation to organic social life."
"When I think of the Law as we know her in the courthouse
and the market, she seems to be a woman sitting by the wayside,
beneath whose overshadowing hood every man shall see counte-
nance of his deserts or needs. The timid and overborne gain heart
from her protecting smile. Fair combatants. manftillh standing to
-TIbmd., 195.
I8Speeches (1934), 471gCollected Legal Papers (1920), 202.
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their rights, see her keeping the lists with the stern and discrimmat-
mng eye of even justice. The wretch who has defied her most sacred
commands, and has thought to creep through ways where she was
not, finds that his path ends with her, and beholds beneath her hood
the inexorable face of death."20
His THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The generalization of the law as a means of giving it a scien-
tific and almost universal character was the controlling principle
of Holmes' jurisprudence. This doctrine was especially applicable
to the constitution which is admittedly a document of general prin-
ciples. This is what the supreme court meant when in McCulloch
v. Maryland,- 1 speaking through Chief Justice John Marshall, it
said "we must never forget it is a constitution we are expounding."
The constitution said the court is not "a legal code," is not a set of
"immutable rides," but contains only "great outlines" and desig-
nates only "important objects." It was "intended to endure for ages
to come, .and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises
of human affairs." The court also said that the nature of the con-
stitution was to be "deduced." Here is definitely announced the
doctrine that the constitution is a body of general principles and
that it was intended to endure for ages by means of adaptation.
The question arises-who is to do the adapting? Are there any
limitations on the scope of adaptation? What is the difference
between an adaptation ?nd an amendment? If an adaptation proves
to be inadequate for its intended purpose, may its scope be extended
by another adaptation? The court did not answer any of these
questions directly, but one is driven to the conclusion that it meant
to say that it is the adapting agency and that the power of adapta-
tion is equal in scope to the requirements of the crisis. Adaptation
was to be a judicial means of giving immortality to the constitu-
tion-the ordinary means in contrast with the extraordinary process
of amendment. It is not my opinion that the court in this case
meant to substitute adaptation for the amendment process but it
announced a doctrine susceptible of such interpretation and of
becoming the basis of judicial supremacy. The general tendency
is for doctrines once announced to be broadened by later inter-
pretation.
Justice Holmes was a great admirer of John Marshall. He once
said "that if American law were to be represented by a single
20Speeches (1934), 17-18.21(1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
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figure, sceptic and worshipper alike would agree without dispute
that the figure could be but one alone, and that one John Mar-
shall. ' ' 22 Holmes was more nearly the duplicate of Marshall than
any other American judge. They were both great philosophers
and logicians, Holmes, however, was a much greater scholar. Both
were nationalistic in constitutional theories, Holmes more so than
Marshall. Marshall said, "no political dreamer was ever wild
enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the
states, and of compounding the American people into one common
mass."23 Holmes, however, vas willing to give the congress su-
premacy "I do not think," he said, "the United States would come
to an end if we lost our power to declare an act of Congress void.
I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make
that declaration as to the laws of the several states.
'
"
24
Holmes believed in national unity He not only fought and
nearly died for it, but constantly held for it on the bench. Speaking
of Marshall, he said "that the theory for which Hamilton argued,
and he (Marshall) decided, and Webster spoke, and Grant fought,
and Lincoln died, is now our corner-stone. 215 He helped lay this
corner-stone and founded a school of jurists who have about com-
pleted the super structure of a totalitarian nationalism.
The creative agency of this nationalism were the economic
forces of the nation, but it was judicial supremacy that constitu-
tionalized it. Beveridge said that in McCidloch v Maryland "In
effect John Marshall thus rewrote the fundamental law ,,21 Bever-
idge, of course, was by no means a critic of Marshall. Woodrow
Wilson said that at the hands of the supreme court "the constitu-
tion has received an adaptation and elaboration which would fill
its framers of the simple days of 1787 with nothing less than
amazement. ' '2 7 While according to good authorty 2 the Marshall
court exercised the power of judicial supremacy, it was never
bold enough to say so. It remained for Holmes and his disciples
frankly to assume this responsibility He said that a judicial deci-
sion involves at every step "the sovereign prerogative of choice."2 19
Further elaborating, he said "It must be remembered, as is clear
22Speeches (1934)
2 SMcCulloch v. Maryland, (1819) 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579.
24Collected Legal Papers (1920), 295-296.
25Speeches (1934), 90-91.26Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall (4 vols.) IV, 308.
27Constitutional Government in the United States (1908), 157-158.
28See Charles Gove Haines, The Role of the Supreme Court in American
Government and Politics (1944), 331-3772 Edward S. Corwin, The Twilight of the Supreme Court (1934) 115.
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from numerous instances of judicial iterpretation of statutes in
Englandand- of constitutions tn this country, that in a cwiliced
-state it is not the will of the sovereign that makes lawyer's la-w,
even when that is its source, but what a body of subjects, namely,
the judges, by whom it is enforced, say is his will."30 In other words
the constitution of the United States as the will of the sovereign
American people is what the judges say it is. In his dissenting
opinion in Lochier v. New York, Justice Holmes frankly spoke
of "judicial legislation."'3
Charles Evans Hughes, when he was governor of New York,
said "we are under a constitution, but the constitution is what the
judges say it is."132 When he became a member of the supreme
court, he did not change his mind. While he was associate justice
of the-supreme court he wrote the opinions in the Minnesota Rate
case3 ' and the Shreveport Rate case"' which practically abolished
intrastate commerce.
Associate justice Stone, later Chief Justice and now the late
Chief Justice, said in a dissenting opinion that "while unconstitu-
tional-exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches is
subject to judicial restraint, the only check on our exercise of
power is our -,nt sense of self-restraint."5
Speaking of the relation of our'economic problems to constitu-
tional law and the necessary readjustments between national and
state authorities, Justice Frankfurter said. "the words of the con-
stitution on which their solution is based are so unrestrasned by
their intninisc ieaning, or by their history, or by tradition, or by
prwor dectsion, that they leave the individual Justice free, if indeed
they do not compel htn to gather meanng not froin reading the
constitutson but from reading life '30 He recommended to his col-
leagues on the court to substitute the reading of life for "the neutral
language of the constitution '3 7 because he said "the judges of the
supreme court are in fact arbiters of social policy They are so
because their duties make them so." He finally concludes that the
forefathers who wrote the document did not understand it or they
would not have provided it with an amendment process because
80Oliver Wendell Holmes, VI Am. Law Rev. (1872), 723-24.
31(1905) 198 U. S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937
-
2Addresses (1908), 139.33(1913) 230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511.
34(1914) 234 U. S. 342, 34 S. Ct. 833, 58 L. Ed. 1341.35United States v. Butler, (1936) 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312, 80 L. Ed. 477
3GFelix Frankfurter and James Landis, (1927) The Business of the Su-
preme Court, 310.37Roscoe Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, (1923) 36 Har. L.
Rev., 641, 651, et. seq.
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he says "The constitution has ample means w, thin itself to meet
the changng needs of successive generations, for it was made for
an undefined and expanding future, and for a people gathered from
many nations and of many tongues.
"If the court, aided by an alert and public-spirited bar, has ac-
cess to the facts and follows them, the conststution is flexible enough
to meet all the new needs of our society."3 8 All that is needed to
give the constitution immortality is "an alert and public-spirited
bar" to persuade the court to use its power of judicial supremacy
in accordance with the trends of American life. This is the logical
conclusion of the Holmes' doctrine of judicial review which with
the aid of his epigoni became the means of overthrowing one hun-
dred and fifty years of judicial precedent which had given a con-
siderable degree of certainty to the constitution and of projecting a
new constitutional development which has practically created a
congressional supremacy which by means of political processes ends
in presidential hegemony This process is not adequately described
in terms of judicial legislation. It makes the court a constituent
body exercising the power reserved to the American people by the
amendment process, and we are told by one of the more conserva-
tive of its members that if it is properly advised by the American
bar it will make the constitution adequate for the free expression
of the unrestricted life of the nation for ages to come. This is the
logical denouement to which the Holmes' conception of judicial
review and of the constitutional lead.
His CONSTITUTIONAL PHILOSOPHY
To Holmes the constitution was neither the beginning nor the
ending of our constitutional development. Its drafting and adoption
merely mark a strategic point in our political evolution and its
meaning is not to be discovered from its words but from its life-
giving qualities. Its interpretation, therefore, should not tend to-
ward definiteness-but toward an indefinitiveness. "The provisions of
the constitution," he said, "are not mathematical formulas having
their essence in their form, they are organic, living institutions
transplanted from English soil. Their signtficance is vital, not for-
real, it is to be gathered not simply by taking the words and a
dictionary, but by considering their origin and the line of their
growth. '39 "Great constitutional provisions," he said, "must be
administered with caution. conle plav must be allowed for the
38Quoted in (1939) 25 Am. Bar Assn. Jour., 167
39Gompers v. United States, (1914) 233 U. S. 604, 610, 34 S. Ct. 693. 58
L. Ed. 1115.
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joints of the machine, and it must be remembered that legislatures
are ultihiate giuardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in
quite as great a degree as the courts."' 0 Here is an expression of
looseness of constitutional construction and as a consequence a
substitution of legislative bodies to a large degree as the ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people for the con-
stitution itself.41 "I recognize without hesitation," he said, "that
judges do and must legislate," 2 but "the legislatures should be
hampered by limitations only if they are found in the plain words
of the constitution."' 3
Justice Holmes was not in sympathy with the demarcation of
authority by the constitution nor with the lines drawn by the court.
He thought the constitution should be made into a judicial docu-
ment by interpretation. He maintained that all such lines could
always "have been drawn a little further to one Mde or to the
other" 4 "The constitution," he said, "is not a pedagogical require-
ment of the impracticable."' "It is a sufficient answer," he said, "to
say that you cannot carry a constitution out with mathecnatical
nicety to logical extremes."" He constantly sought for reasonable-
ness and simplicity. Why should interpretation of the constitution
open a Pandora's box of difficulties? He frequently referred to
"common understanding," "common sense," "fair play," "rational
and fair man," "the reasonable man," "the man in the street," a
"civilized society," and "invisible radiation." Why attempt to dis-
tinguish between "direct and indirect," "immediate and remote,"
"substantial and insubstantial" and "material and immaterial."
This was to him the mere fulminations of a petty judicial mind.
He was in favor of expermentation 4- and was more interested
40Missouri, Texas & Kansas Ry. Co. v. May, (1904) 194 U. S. 267, 270,
24 S. Ct. 638, 48 L. Ed. 971.
4"Felix Frankfurter, Constitutional Opinions of justice Holmes, (1916)
29 Har. L. Rev. 683.
42Southern Pacific Co.:v. Jensen, (1917) 244 U. S. 205, 221, 37 S. Ct.
524, 61 L. Ed. 1086.
43Lomsville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Barker Asphalt Paving Co.,
(1905) 197 U. S. 430, 25 S. Ct. 466, 49 L. Ed. 819.
"4The Common Law (1881), 127
45Domimon Hotel Company v. Arizona (1919) 249 U. S. 265, 39 S. CL
273, 63 L. Ed. 597
46Paddell v. New York, (1908) 211 U. S. 446, 29 S. Ct. 139, 53 L. Ed.
275.
47"There is nothing I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth
Amendment beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the
making of social experiments that an important.part of the community desires,
in the insulated chambers afforded by the several states, even though the
experiments may seem futile or even Marxian to me and to those whose
judgment I most respect." Truax v. Corrigan, (1921) 257 U. S. 312, 42
S. Ct. 124,66 L. Ed. 254.
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in the means of achieving ends than in the ends themselves. "While
the courts must exercise a judgment of their own," he said, "it by
no means is true that every law is void which may seem to the
judges who pass upon it excessive, unsuited to its ostensible end,
or based upon conceptions of morality with which they disagree.
Considerable latitude must be allowed for differences of view as
well as for possible peculiar conditions which this court can know
but imperfectly, if at all. Otherwise a constitution, instead of em-
bodying only fundamental rules of right, as generally understood
by all English-speaking communities, would become the partisan
of a particular set of ethical or economic opinions, which by no
means are held semper unique et ab omnibus."' 8 "The Fourteenth
Amendment," he said, "does not enact Mr Ilerbert Spencer's
Social Statics."4 "The traditions and habits of centuries," he
said, "were not intended to be overthrown when that amendment
was passed.""0 He believed the states should be allowed to per-
form social experiments even though they interfered with com-
merce and contractual rights. He said once that "when the states
want to do something and I cannot find something in the constitu-
tion to prevent it, 'God dammit, I let them do it.'"
While he was a bold experimentalist almost to the point of
complete indifference as to results, he was a collectivist, believing
that the court should follow "dommant opunion." His check on
innovation was not a constitutional one but the cost of the experi-
ment. Get the facts and estimate the cost. "Personally," he said,
"I like to know what the bill is going to be before I order a
luxury "51 He did not believe in panaceas,52 but he thought that
man had a right to seek the realization of his desires, and he was
willing to tolerate experiments in which he had no faith." The
inght of the coniumnity was controlling. Like Spinoza he believed
that might gave the letters of credit to right. "Constitutions, like
any other mortal contrivance," he said, "have to take some
chances. '54 "In modern societies," he said, "every part is related
4sOtis v. Parker, (1903) 187 U. S. 606, 608-9, 23 S. Ct. 168, 47 L. Ed.
323.
49Lochner v. New York, (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937
5OInterstate Consol. Street Ry. Co. v. Massachusetts, (1907) 207 U. S.
79, 87, 28 S. Ct. 26, 52 L. Ed. 111.
-'Collected Legal Papers (1920) 30752Speeches (1934) 102. "I have no belief in panaceas and almost none
in sudden ruin."5 3
"The notion that with socialized property we should have women
free and a piano for everybody seems to me an empty humbug." Ideals and
Doubts, (1915) 10 111. L. Rev. 1.
54Binn v Nelson, (1911) 222 U. S. 1, 7, 32 S. Ct. 1, 56 L. Ed. 65.
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so organically to every other, that what affects any portion must
be felt more or less by all the rest. Therefore, unless everything is
to be forbidden and legislation is to come to a stop, it is not
enough to show that, in the working of a statute, there is some
tendency, logically discernible, to interfere with commerce or exist-
ing contracts."5 5 In other words, there was no check on the power
of the community. He believed in the man of action. He regarded
life as the use of one's powers in an endless struggle of interests. 8
His THEORY OF THE STATE
Recently there has been considerable controversy over Holmes'
theory of the state.5 7 It is difficult to believe that Holmes was
totalitarian in his philosophy, despite the fact that he was because
we do not want to think of him in that light. It is almost unthink-
able that an American who achieved the distinction of being the
greatest jurist of his day according to many emient authorities
could support the doctrine of the unlimited state. One has a feeling
for Justice Holmes and a pride in his distinction that causes him to
resist reaching such a conclusion. Doubtless no man ever meant
more thoroughly what he said than Justice Holmes.
There is no doubt about his opposition to natural law "The
jurists," he said, "who believe in natural law seem to me to be in
that nawe state of minud that accepts what has been familiar and ac-
cepted by them and their neighbors as something that must be
accepted by all men everywhere.""8 He frankly states here that it
requires simplicity of mind to accept the doctrine of natural law
and makes it clear that he was not subject to this classification. He
proposes no substitute. Is there any substitute?
He was recognized as a totalitarian by other distinguished totali-
tarians. Professor Harold J. Laski of the University of London,
the leading radical of his country and a distinguished totalitarian
political scientist, a great admirer of Justice Holmes, in discussing
Holmes' political philosophy said that he rejected all absolute
concepts and held that "the individual is not a subject of rights
55Diamond Glue Co. v. United States Glue Co., (1903) 187 U. S. 611,
616, 23 S. Ct. 206, 47 L. Ed. 328. Italics are mine.58Wigmore, Justice Holmes and the Law of Torts, (1916) 29 Har. L.
Rev. 601, 603-604.57See Ben W Palmer, Hobbs, Holmes and Hitler, (1945) 31 Am. Bar
Assn. Jour., 509; Ibid., Defense against Leviathan, (1946) 32 Am. Bar. Asso.
Jour., 328, Charles W Briggs, Justice Holmes .as not on a Ladder to
Hitler, (1946) 32 Am. Bar Assn. Jour. 631, Ben W Palmer, Reply to
Charles W Briggs, (1946) 32 Am. Bar Assn. Jour., 635.58Collected Legal Papers (1920), 312.
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which the state is not entitled to invade.""9 He further said that
Holmes was a Spinoza and believed "that nught gives the letters
of credit to right" and that "Rights are the products of law and
not a framework in winch law must work.""0 It is clear that Laski
thinks that Holmes believed that might creates law and law creates
rights and that there is no limitation on this process.
Holmes completely rejected the Kantian idea that man is an
end and contended that he is only a means of the state. "If we want
conscripts," he said, "we march them up to the front with bayonets
in their rear to die for a cause in which perhaps they do not be-
lieve. The enemy we treat not even as a means but as an obstacle to
be abolished, if so it may be. I feel no pangs of conscience over
either step, and naturally am slow to accept a theory that seems
to be contradicted by practices that I approve."' He believed that
"the predominant power in the community" had the right to take
the life and the property of the individual whenever in its opinion
the interest of society demands it. This is the essence of statiim.
Again he said "When it comes to a decision by the head of the
state upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of indi-
viduals must yield to what he deemus the necessities of the nioment.
Public danger warranits the substitution of executive process for
judicial process."'0 2 How much do these quotations leave to doubt
as to his authoritarianism? How close does it approach the philoso-
phy of Treitschke? "The dominant idea in Treitschke's Politik,"
says Coker, "is that power is the most distinctive attribute of the
state and that the state is morally justified in applying its power
without concern for individual aims and interests.""2 Of course,
Treitschke's Politik was Hitler's bible.
Justice Holmes believed in the biological theory of the state
which was the controlling basis of recent German juristic thought.
He frequently spoke of the organic character of the constitution and
of Society Of course, the contract theory of the state was a part
of the baggage of the doctrine of natural law and though basic in
the establishment of the limited state had to be eliminated as a
barrier to totalitarianism. Man as a mere grain of sand could have
nothing to do with the establishment of his political institutions.
The entire philosophy of the Declaration of Independence is only
59(1931) 40 Yale Law Jour., 683, 685.60 Ibid., 685.
6 1Collected Legal Papers (1920), 304. Italics are mine.
-2Moyer v. Peabody, (1909) 212 U. S. 78, 85, 29 S. Ct. 235, 53 L. Ed.
410.
" Francis W Coker, Recent Political Thought (1934), 440.
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for the simple minded. In Missouri, v. Holland, speaking for the
Supreme Court, Justice Holmes said "that when we are dealing
with words that also are constituent act, like the constitution of the
United States, we must realize that they have called into life a
being the development of which could not have been foreseen cona-
pletely by the nost gifted of its begetters. It was enough for them
to realize or to hope that they had created an orgaiusni, it has
taken a century and has cost their successors much sweat and blood
to prove that they created a nation.! 6
Finally Justice Holmes ranks as a great dissenter, second only
to justice Harlan who registered 316 dissenting opinions. How-
ever, in the case of Holmes, his dissents later became the law of
the land. Whether his contribution to constitutional law will ulti-
mately bulk larger than that of Chief Justice Marshall may depend
to some extent on the future course of American politics. At the
present time we are living under a constitution which has substan-
tially resulted from his influence and is far less in harmony with
the original than that of Marshall's.
Holmes was true to his philosophy He was a nonconformist
only to be a conformist in a higher and universal sense. He was an
exponent of the cosmic philosophy of John Fiske. Everything had
its true value and highest significance in terms of the cosmos. He
was always searching for generalities and principles as a means
of giving a scientific character to the law and thus to harmonize
it with the universal. This -vas his grand conception of the law.
He regarded the law as only "a gale confederate with the current
of the soul."6 It is only a part of the music of the spheres. By
becoming a master of the law, he said, you could "connect your-
self with the universe and catch an echo of the infinite, a glimpse of
its unfathomable process, a hint of the umversal." 66 In this sense
law became a science and its master could get a perspective of in-
finty.
Man like the law assumed his greatest importance as a part of
the cosmos. "It is enough for us," he said, "that the universe has
produced us and has within it, as less than it, all that we believe
and love. If.we think of our existence not as that of a little god
outside, butas that of a ganglion within, we have the infinite behind
us. It gives, us our only but our adequate significance. A grain
of sand has -the same, but what competent person supposes that he
64(1920) 252 U. S. 416, 40 S. Ct. 382, 64 L. Ed. 641.
65Quoted from Wordsworth by S. A. Brooke, Naturalism in English
Poetry (1920), 158.66Collected Legal Papers (1920), 202.
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understands a grain of sand? That is as much beyond our grasp
as man." 67 He believed "that man may have cosmic destinies that
he does not understand.""8 "Why," he said, "should we employ
the energy that is furnished to us by the cosmos to defy it and
shake our fist at the sky? It seems to me silly "09
This doctrine of unity was the law of organization to Justice
Holmes. Everything regardless of its nature was a part of an
organism. "All that life offers any man from which to start his
thinking or his striving," he said, "is a fact. And if this universe is
one universe, if it is so far thinkable that you can pass in reason
from one part of it to another, it does not matter very much what
that fact is. For every fact leads to every other by the path of the
air Only men do not yet see how, always. And your business as
thinkers is to make plainer the way from some thing to the whole
of things, to show the rational connection between your fact and
the frame of the universe. If your subject is law, the roads are
plain to anthropology, the science of man, to political economy,
the theory of legislation, ethics, and thus by several paths to your
final view of life. It would be equally true of any subject. The only
difference is in the ease of seeing the way To be master of any
branch of knowledge, you must master those which lie next to it,
and thus to know anything you must know all."70
This organic philosophy which gave an indissoluble character to
the facts of life and which inevitably ended in unity could give
but one answer to the doctrines of federalism, separation of powers
and checks and balances. It could not logically stop short of national
sovereignty, the unitary state, absolute sovereignty, law as the
command of the sovereign or the will of the majority and finally
the totalitarian state. This then is the process by which the great
jurist thought that he had discovered the route that man is destined
to follow to his mysterious goal. It was the dominant philosophy
of his time but it is not the philosophy that gave birth to the nation,
that is the foundation of its constitutional system of government
and that it has spent much of its life and resources to give to the
rest of mankind.
According to Holmes there could be no rights against the com-
mand of the dominant social group, the constitution of the United
States to the contrary notwithstanding. To him the binding charac-
ter of law was physical force. "Law," he said, is "a statement of
V7Ibid., 316.
68abid., 296.
6DIbid., 315.7oTbicL, 29-30.
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the circumstances in which the public force will be brought to bear
upon men through the courts."'' 7 "Sovereignty," he said, "is a
form of power, and the will of the sovereign is law because he has
power to compel obedience or punish disobedience and for no other
reason. The limits within which his will is law, then, are those
within which he has or is believed to have power to compel or
punsh." "I think," he said, "that the sacredness of human life is
a purely municipal ideal of no validity outside the jurisdiction. I
believe that force, mitigated so far as may be by good manners, is
the ultsnm ratio." "Just so far as the aid of the public force is given
a man he has a legal right, and this right is the same whether his
claim is founded in righteousness or inequity." So-called rights
were, to Holmes, -withdrawable privileges at the pleasure of the
sovereign-the organized majority. "I am so skeptical as to our
knowledge about the goodness or badness of laws," he said, "that
I have no practical criticism except what the crowd wants." This
philosophy is certainly totalitarian m character.
Of course, Holmes as well as all other authoritarian liberals
would use this unlimited power for humanitarian purposes. This
does not change its totalitarian character or guarantee that such
power will always be used for such benevolent purposes. Humani-
tarian totalitarianism is not liberalism or sociological jurisprudence.
The naked fact is it is unlimited power to be used by the crowd
that gets possession of it as it sees fit. We have been told that such
power in the hands of a "Peoples Government" is safe, but in
the hands of "economic puppets" unsafe. This is a significant state-
ment with which advocates of constitutional government would
agree. Its use is not limited by. the constitution but subject only to
the mandate of the ballot box.
By way of summary, it may be said that Justice Holmes had no
economic blueprint for the future, or a legal chart for the law, or
a constitutional straightjacket for the nation. He did not believe
in any of them. He was creedless and codeless. He wanted the facts
and felt that they should control. He believed that law should be
guided by experience rather than by logic. Law should have its
feet on the ground rather than on Olympus.
While Justice Holmes was generally classified a sociological
jurist, he did not hesitate to use the whole range of the social
sciences as a basis of understanding and of applying the law He
accepted those portions of the historical and analytical doctrines
71American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., (1909) 213 U. S. 347, 356,
29 S. Ct 511, 53 L. Ed. 826.
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as suited his purposes and rejected their dogmas. He considered
precedents as only suggestive and prophetic, but, in no sense.
definitive. He excluded natural law from the juristic world and did
not believe that the rights of man were engraved on stone for all
time. He rejected the doctrine of absolute truth. He saw lines of
growth in the past, considered the experience around him, and
warned against rigid formulas for the future. He knew that the
tender roots of the oak could split the foundation of the substantial
structure.
Fortunately for the world, Justice Holmes touched life as
well as the law To him, man was a part of the law and the law
was a part of man-his greatest achievement-largely a response
to his desire for certainty and repose though both were unattain-
able and undesirable to Holmes, both meant death, The destiny
of man was not repose but life. Life to Justice Holmes meant
more life. It meant functioning till the bell rings. He loved life
and lived it in the highest and fullest sense. His influence will never
end. It will follow both man and the law indefinitely His place is
fixed in the annals of jurisprudence as one of the greatest jurists
of all time. Only the arcana of futurity can tell the full story
However, the most adequate description of him will always be that
he was Oliver Wendell Holmes. Jr
